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THE THEOLOGY OF SIR HENRY JONES

By

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Clynnog College, 1914

Thesis

Submitted in the department of
Christian Theology in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in
Pacific School of Religion

1925

SIR HENRY JONES' CONTRIBUTION TO THEOLOGY BASED UPON HIS VOLUME "A FAITH THAT ENQUIRES"

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"A FAITH THAT ENQUIRES" - Sir Henry Jones

Section A - A Plea for Freedom

As one reads these lectures, the last contribution to the world of Sir Henry Jones, one is struck, not so much by his genius as a philosopher and thinker, as by his strong faith. The author might well be called the champion of Reason and Love, for around these two pivots, as it were, his teaching turns. To him, Reason and Love are the ruling and supreme forces in the universe. Throughout these lectures one hears the voice of the preacher, proclaiming his own personal belief and faith. Every one of them is in some measure a confession of faith in Reason and Love. From one viewpoint, perhaps, it could be maintained that the chief value of the volume is not so much its contribution to thought, along purely scholarly lines, as its biographical value. It is the story of a great soul, on its pilgrimage in quest of truth. In saying this, I am not in the least depreciating his philosophy, for we have here a great teacher, or as the late Dr. James Denny said, "the most influential teacher in Scotland in his day" - a great teacher unfolding to us the deep things of his soul.

I. His Contribution to Theological Thought

In this thesis, our task is to point out if we can, the chief contribution of Sir Henry Jones to theology. Probably all would agree that the central theme of the writer is "The Philosophy of Religion". In the first lecture he writes, "Lord Gifford's aim was thoroughly and directly practical. He desired free

> "discussion with a view to the knowledge of the truth, and he desired knowledge of the truth with a view to the well-being of man." (1)

In this inquiry of faith he demands the utmost freedom. He regards religion in the same way as the man of science looks upon his field, and insists upon the same untrammelled methods of proceedure. The great desire which seems to guide Sir Henry Jones in these lectures is the desire for a statement of his faith and understanding of the truth which would be simple and clear, so that all could understand; a statement also free from any given "seat of authority", either of Book or Church. He went a step further and insisted that no claim should be valid unless it coincided with the experience of any reasonably-minded and normal individual.

> "Knowledge", he asserts, "must be real. If the knowledge is not real, then both affirmation and denial are out of place; they must be out of place where nothing is certain. Doubt itself is absurd under such conditions; enquiry is vain, all criticism is baseless; there can be neither truth nor error; the intelligence is dismissed as futile. It would seem, therefore, that there can be no greater necessity than that of making decisively clear, if this be possible, whether in professing to know religious facts we are dealing with realities that are intelligible, or with the fictitious products of our imagination and the confused emanations of our desires." (2)

Again: "Religion is a practical matter, and so indeed is irreligion." (3)

That is to say, it must be "consistent", as Professor Buchham says, "with a man's normal experience."

(1) "Faith that Enquires" p. 2
(2) do p. 3
(3) do p. 3

II. The Place of Reason in Philosophy

To the millions of people who cannot accept the ordinary teachings of the Church, Sir Henry Jones endeavored to teach by precept and example, that honest and impartial inquiry, without prejudice, invariably tends to strengthen and sustain religious faith. Let a man seek God with his reason and he shall find Him. He appeals to the Church to welcome any and all criticism of her dogma; nothing but good can come to the Church from such scrutiny. For religion, after all, if it be true religion, cannot survive except as the truth is shown to be secure. It belongs to the realm of reason to search for truth; and it must always be allowed complete freedom for its high endeavor. Truth, as well as reason, demands this freedom. Our author knew well enough that more than one attempt had been made to formulate an almost atheistic system, that the philosopher (Kant) who took the leading part in these attempts to enthrone "pure reason", himself had denied the ability of "pure reason" to come to a knowledge of the reality which lies beyond the sphere of things as they appear. According to the teaching of Kant, Religion which was within the limits of reason did not mean more than that we accept the moral urge as if it were the promptings of the divine. It did not include or mean fellowship with God. Sir Henry Jones did not accept this teaching of Kant's, for he believed that only reason could guide reason and, so to speak, correct itself.

The question which prompts itself here is this: Do the great philosopher of the "pure reason" and the author of these lectures mean quite the same thing when they speak of reason? What are we to understand by "pure reason"? The

answer is confined to two alternatives -

(a) We must say that "pure reason" is something apart, a faculty, as it were, independent of the other faculties of the mind or soul,

or (b) The soul in its entirety.

It is obvious that the soul of man, when it thinks, or feels, or wishes, or whatever it does, is acting as a whole, as a unit, and is not one faculty for one kind of activity and another for another. The soul, while made up of different faculties, is at the same time one whole, a unity. The author himself in his seventh lecture, I think, shows this to be true. According to Hume -

> "Reason, the faculty of knowing, observes and lets the world remain as it finds it. It cannot even furnish motives, and it has no preferences of any kind. And even those philosophers, like Kant, consider that Reason has a practical as well as a theoretical function, and that its activities are a condition of morality as well as of knowledge, distinguished between these two spheres of its operation." (1)

The obvious difficulty here is that Sir Henry Jones, so far as we understand him, speaks of the pure reason yet denies its function, thus tending to confusion of thought.

III. Philosophy Takes into Account Morality, Spirit, Reason

As we have seen above, we may speak of reason as acting alone, apart, as it were, from the other faculties of the soul, but we cannot assume a philosophy of life, comprehensive and meeting the demands of man, without recognizing all the

(1) "Treatise on Human Nature", vol. II, p. 193

different faculties, each reacting upon the other. Their true function, after all, consists of their unity.

> "Metaphysics", according to Bradley, "is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."

This statement, though it savours of the jocular, contains much that is true; however, it will be well perhaps to keep it in mind as we try to grasp some of the things put forth by our author in this volume. Towards the end of his book, he states that his whole system is dependent on one assumption, an assumption, moreover, he has not attempted to justify. It is seen, therefore, if this assumption cannot be maintained, the whole system collapses.

> "The assumption is that the moral life has a value which is final, unlimited and absolute. By the moral life I mean the process of forming a good character; by good character I mean a way of living which, in all its details, is dedicated to the service of the best, and is therefore the fulfilment, at one and the same time, of the moral law and of the will of God. From the absoluteness and finality of the value of the process of learning goodness it follows, that everything which furthers that process is good in the most unqualified sense, and that everything which hinders it is evil. Moral progress is our principle of evaluation and our only authoritative measuring rod. We approve and we condemn by reference to it, and to it only." (1)

We see at once that this is a most important assumption. We are bound to ask: Will the ordinary man accept it as reasonable and fair? Does it appeal to his reason? It may be the assumption will be cast aside without much consideration and regarded as the impractical musings of a philosopher, good for the study and class room, but out of place in the ordinary ways of ordinary people. Sir Henry Jones himself has foreseen this reception of his ideas.

(1) "Faith that Enquires" p. 270

He sees the difficulty of justifying this assumption, especially in the realm of practical living. He points out that -

> "The consistent use of spiritual criteria is not easy to any one in the present world; and to the secular-minded man the argument will to the end seem to rest on sheer assumption, and our results will appear to be just the innocuous fancies of unpractical philosophers. It is probable that nothing short of the actual experience of living the religious life will suffice to justify our assumption, and to quality the critic to pass judgment." (1)

The validity of the assumption, after all, must be discovered in the actual experience of truth in our personal life.

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 271

IV. The Function of Reason

We have seen that Reason does not evolve a theory out of nothing, or as the spider weaves its web out of itself. It must needs have something to work upon and to work with. Its function, therefore, it seems, must be to arrange and to connect the materials already at hand. Reason must clarify and make things plain. We have also seen that there is nothing that is not related to something else. Life, after all, is one. It is a unity with diversity. Nothing will therefore be understood fully except as it is understood and seen in its proper relationship. It is the sphere of Reason to point the way to, and effect that relationship. This is true in all of the manifold connections of human life and of all world phenomena. The Bible, for instance, is a collection of literature representing all manners of different peoples andtimes. We are beginning to realise that we cannot unravel its full and deep meaning without delving deep, and scrutinizing carefully, the history of the peoples by whom it was first produced; the conditions in which they lived, their manners and customs, etc. The Bible cannot be understood apart from its backgrounds and origins. It is a product of its own world. Man also is the product of his world, and lives in continual dependence upon that world. His roots are in the soil; his body is of the earth; his physical life is dependent on the relationships he has with his physical environment. Even his mental life, to a great extent, is dependent upon the physical universe around him. For once you shut man off from any relationship with nature through his senses, there will result an empty mind. For after all, is not knowledge, knowledge

of the material, or at least knowledge which comes through material channels? It may be that the mystic can conceive of knowledge that does not depend upon the material senses; but we are safe in assuming that for the great mass of ordinary individuals, knowledge comes through experience of things in the physical universe.

V. The Individual and Society

The interdependence of the individual and society is equally true.

> "We are not saved each by himself, and then added to one another like marbles in a bag, or like grains of sand in a sand pile; a saved society is not made by any such external process. We are members one of another in our sins, and we are members one of another in the whole process of being saved from sin. I cannot go alone either toward or away from the Kingdom, for it is my relation to someone else, a relation of help or of hindrance, that determines the direction that my own character is taking." (1)

For the individual, society provides education and literature, and all the means of culture and development. It is societ that teaches him useful occupation and prepares work for him to do. It is here the individual finds his religion, his ideals. All the arts and crafts and the sciences he inherits are the products of past society. It is also in the bosom of society that he finds friends and relations. To fully understand one individual American today, one must probe deep into the past history of men and times far removed in point of time and place. It is impossible to understand one individual without knowing the history of the human race, and also its relationships with its physical environments from time to time. Only the whole

(1) "Social Theory of Religious Education" Geo. H. Coe, p. 6

race will account for the one, and to see his relationship to the race in the whole, is the only way to understand the individual in the last resort. The only complete system is the system that contains everything - God, Man, the World. Therefore, we cannot have an acceptable and final understanding regarding either God, Man or the World until we see their complete and full relationship one with another.

VI. Reason, the Foundation of Life

According to Sir Henry Jones, Reason is the basis of all life. This implies that all things are related in one complete system; this system, therefore, in the last resort must account for every fact of experience. In other words, everything is susceptible to reason. If a man is to aspire to the Knowledge of God, he must do so through his reason. This will also reveal to man how God reveals Himself, since the Divine reason and that of the human are the same. The finite mind and the infinite mind are the same as to their nature. Again we come to know all things through experiencing the objects around us, and in us. Every fact of experience and life has its relationships; all things are related to one another. That is to say, every fact is representative of itself and its connections, and a fact cannot be known except as we know its relationships. What we can know of the universe at one time is comparatively small; that is, our experiential knowledge at a given moment is small; at the same time the universe as a whole is represented in that small compass. For example, when we see an apple fall to the ground and know why it falls, we know that everything in

the universe is one, because of the law of gravity. In this way, the fact having once come into the orbit of one's experience, the reason proceeds to seek the relationship existing between it and other facts, not only those facts which come directly into one's knowledge, but also those other facts by analogy or association which might be related to it.

Thus the things seen are also indications, at least, of the unseen. Things felt are indications of those which cannot be felt. The author in his philosophy pre-supposes the being of One who is beyond the experience of the finite mind. What is beyond the finite must be either nothing or the infinite. The system will not be complete unless we suppose the existence of the Absolute. We cannot, therefore, account for anything except as we assume the being of the Absolute. The test of the truth of any system with its hypotheses and assumptions is, after all, that it makes room, and accounts for every fact that rightly belongs to it, and therefore ought to have a place within its scheme of things.

VII. The Nature of the Absolute

It seems to be evident that the Absolute must contain all the conditions of all the finite phenomena. We cannot argue that the natural scheme produced itself; nature itself points beyond itself for its explanation. As to man, the spiritual capacities, like everything else that belong to him, have a history which passes beyond his individual existence. We cannot believe that man discovered or invented

these capacities. Even their social origin is only secondary. They have gone into the stuff of which society is made, and are, in fact, forms of the real and have come to man as a gift. The only thing that belongs to the individual is the use that he makes of them. Time was when these spiritual qualities were attributed to matter, but now it is seen that matter does not contain the conditions and cannot produce them. The spiritual can have its source only in that which is itself spiritual. The Absolute must therefore, be spiritual. The process of its revelation in the Universe is a spiritual process. Nature is but the earlier and less complete stage of that self-revelation. Man is a truer and better revelation than nature; he is a free spirit, at his best, making for perfection. -

"A perfect man were the incarnate God". (1)

VIII. Incarnation

This is the truth to which Christinaity bears witness. The God of the Christian religion must therefore be a person, or self-conscious individual to whom there is nothing which is finally strange or alien. "Spirit that is not individual means nothing". But individuality implies a more intimate and deep relationship between the Absolute and its finite appearances than is conveyed in the phrases usually employed to express it. It is not enough to say that the Absolute contains finite facts, nor even that it transmutes them by relating them to one another through its own unity. Facts are not first given as isolated and then

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 206

linked to one another and made into a system. They are not at one time separate from the Absolute, and at another taken up into the Absolute. But to regard God as a Being which somehow sustains the different modes of finite existence without implicating itself in their destiny, is inadequate. If we admit the spiritual character of the power that expresses itself in the universe, we at the same time admit its individuality and its self-consciousness. If we admit its self-conscious individuality, we admit that which is for itself and gives everything a turn inward as subjective experience, and, at the same time and for the same reason, that which finds itself everywhere and is veritably omnipotent. But no purely monotheistic conception can meet these requirements, not even that of a creator who projects its products and then lets them be. The self-conscious being is immanent in his world. God is always present in his world; He is part of it. Pringle-Pattison says:

> "It is wrong to place divine action in the past or in the future; but it is not, in the same way, wrong to place it in the present. The past and the future are essentially relative, and indeed negative conceptions, the no-more and the not-yet; but the 'is' of the present, if we take it as we do in action and in all direct experience, is not infected by the relativity and hence there is in it something comparable to eternity. If we speak of the divine activity as an eternal act, that means for us, if we throw it as we must, into terms of time, an act which is being accomplished now, and which we are helpingto accomplish." (1)

(1) Pringle-Pattison, "The Idea of God", pp. 369-370

The Absolute shares in the activities of the finite, and is a doer and sufferer in the world's life.

IX. Idealism

How must we account for the presence of Idealism in man, and his desire to realize that Idealism? As we have already seen, the complete system of philosophy is the ultimate explanation of all things; therefore, we must assume that the Good exists as the eternal reality, God working in and through his world; the Perfect, as it were, dwelling in the imperfect; the Infinite in the finite; and not only dwelling, but also working out his desires according to His will in the finite. The Absolute is his strength, and wisdom, counsellor and friend. This is the faith that is at the foundation of religion; the philosopher must have a place for religious hypothesis (faith) in his system. If the system is to be consistent with itself, we come to the conclusion that the Absolute of the philosopher and the God of the religious man are the same. God is therefore all in all; in Him all things move and have their being. He in them and they in Him - these together complete the circle.

> "The religious man, like Enoch, 'walks with God.' A light, like that of the Shekinah, always shines upon his path. He has no will of his own in an exclusive sense; and there is a sense in which not even his personality is any longer his own. These are familiar experiences. Are they possible if God dwells apart and contemplates forever his own perfection? Would they be possible were God the monarchic Ruler, or the Stern Judge demanding a quid pro quo in the blood of a redeemer in return for forgiveness of sins? Or are not all these conceptions irreconcilable with the fundamental truth of the religion of love?"

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 210

Thus far philosophy has only partially done its work. For it has performed only a portion of its task in showing how the finite implies the Absolute. It ought also be able to show what in the Absolute calls for the finite, "what necessities, if any, dwell in the Absolute, and account for its eternal outgoing and expression of itself in objects." (1)

> "Why did God", it is sometimes asked, "come out of his isolated perfection so as to complete himself only through the medium of the Universe? The answer is comparatively simple. It is given in the conception of God as Love. Love must have an object." (2)

X. Love

Our author in his discussion upon Reason has gone into it with great detail and care as we have already seen. He extols Reason to the heights, places her like a queen upon the throne of his thought. To Sir Henry Jones, Reason is the fair lady who shall guide and ultimately show the way to all truth. But when he comes to speak of Love, we do not find the same definite attempt at definition. Instead of defining, he quotes from the Bible or lines from his favorite poet, Browning, to show us what love is. Consequently there is more or less ambiguity in his explanation and his use of the word love. Perhaps it would be true to say that the best interpretation our author gives to Love is a man's consciousness of the Best, his yearning for the Best, and his consecration to and for the Best. The Best consists of the true, the beautiful, and the good. These three are the

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 210
(2) do p. 211

elements which make up the Best. The Best is also called the Perfect, the greatest good, andthe supreme good. Love, according to these definitions, if they may be so regarded, is given a very wide range of meaning. The good is all-inclusive. The author tends to emphasize the moral aspect in the idea of love more than anything else. It is the morality of the action or of goodness that seems to appeal to him. This is more fundamental to religion than anything else. He shows this from the history of Christianity. The moral laws are all important.

> "Even the gods, when a Plato arrives, must respect the moral laws." (1)

XI. Morality and Religion - Their Antagonism

The foregoing study of the relation between the moral and love leads us to the important question of the relationship between morality and religion. The author in his eighth lecture begins by discussing the antagonism between morality and religion. This perhaps is the most difficult and important of our problems; namely, the inter-relation of morality and religion. He considers, to begin with, some things which are obvious; that morality is something which belongs to the ordinary realm of everyday life. In one sense it is the whole of life. Morality enters into all the conceivable contacts of life; the daily wants, desires, the things to be done, some call to be obeyed or disobeyed or neglected; then approval or disapproval follows. When a deed is done, we pass a moral judgment upon it and proclaim it good or bad. Every time we do this, we recognize the

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 96

moral law. We have either sustained that law or we have broken it.

> "A moral law has been either respected or neglected." (1)

Again, these commonplace tasks have about them another truth. They are always "ours". They are "inalienable". Mine is mine, and yours is yours, and theirs is theirs. There is a certain individuality, a personal privacy and "apartness", and single-handedness about duties. However, a person may work with others. The will to act carries with it a certain individuality, a personal privacy. However his environment may press upon him, and however deeply the social life into which he was born has penetrated into him and become the sustenance and tissue of his soul, his acts are his own but are "exclusively" his own for no influence has entered into him without thereby becoming an element in his individuality.

XII. Religion and Individuality

But religion tends to break down the barriers of individuality. The first interest of the religious man is in some good; he lives for it and the supreme value of the object of his devotion, his God, lifts the exercise of religious functions above the level of what is secular or even moral. It does this when it penetrates what would otherwise be commonplace. The spirit of religion may attend a mother upon the hearth, as she moves among her children, radiating love's services all day long.

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 94

Nevertheless, on the same hearth, at the beginning and close of the day, there are definite religious rites. There is family worship, and an hour that is sacred. Then the soul for the moment ascends out of the reach of ordinary cares and its eyes look away to where the horizon of the present life dips out of sight. -

"Far above earth's cloudy regions,
O my soul, behold the sphere!
Where the breeze is ever tender,
Where the sky is ever clear;
Happy Myriads,
Resting there in perfect peace."

Primitive religions became ceremonious. Primitive communities gather together for praise and prayer and sacrifice. The rites on the great occasions when the people gather together in this way are always impressive and are accompanied by all the pomp and pageantry that will make them the more impressive. They are conducted by men gifted with the powers that impress, men who are set apart dedicated, who are held to be in mystical communion with the unseen powers. Thus a priesthood grows, and religion becomes a thing apart - sacred - not to be touched by ordinary hands, or approached in ordinary moods. Awe which is a feeling that fluctuates between fear and reverence, is the primitive worshipper's mood, and the strangness of something that lies beyond - beyond all things that can be seen or heard, beyond the utmost limits of even possible knowledge - is the most insistent characteristic of his God. Thus Herbert Spencer's conception of religion as awe of the unknown, describes not inaccurately the primitive man's blind groping for the Best.

Thus religion and morality come to occupy different places. Religion henceforth will have nothing to do with the ordinary

ways of life; these are all "secular" and morality does nd concern itself with religion, which is sacred and aloof, a matter of rites and ceremonies. This difference in their interests permits for a time a mutual indifference between them. Each goes its own way; the moralist need not be religious, except now and then, and on special days (Sundays, etc.) Neither does the religious man at this stage need to be moral.

This indifferance, as history shows, cannot last; anything that grows, human life included, will maintain its unity, as well as branch out into differences. After all, man must be consistent with himself, if he is to escape war with himself. Here we see, as mankind develops, that both religion and morality claim, more and more completely, dominion over the whole of life. As the moral consciousness gathers strength, the wrong done in the name of religion, the barbarous and cruel rites and sacrifices, lose their sacred power and charm. They are condemned before the bar of moral integrity.

Yet religion on the other hand, widens its domain, and claims more and more authority over the things of daily life. If it is external and formal, as it generally is at this primitive stage, then it emphasizes the outward things, it sees more and more to "mint and annis and cummin" and insists upon abstention from common things.

Morality at this stage is placed in an inferior position as compared with religion. It has little spiritual and no lasting value. It becomes indeed to be regarded as the enemy of the spiritual as all things mundane are so regarded. The natural is held to be the antagonist of the spiritual.

The ordinary occupations necessary to sustain life are tolerated only in the laity, but those who have given themselves

completely to God must reduce their physical needs to the lowest limits, renounce the world, engage neither in industry nor in commerce, nor follow the arts of war or peace. The are to be pilgrims on their way home through the wilderness of this world. Everything belonging to flesh is corrupt. Even the domestic ties and the other social relations, which in truth furnish the opportunities of the good life and are the nurseries of all the virtues, lie outside of the limits of the sacred life. In short, the world and the flesh are ranked with the devil.

The history of the Christian Church makes this antagonism plain. There is at the same time a change noted in the relation betwenn these two forces. On the whole, morality seems to be strengthening its claim, at times at the expense of religion. We do not any longer call an immoral man religious, though perhaps we would allow more lapses to the religious devotee than a moral rigorist could approve in himself; on the other hand, religion is not now deemed necessary to the moral life. Men like Matthew Arnold consider that religion can only add to morality a certain emotional intensity, whose value is doubtful.

At times the moral attitude is held to be even nobler than the religious, because it means that a man is more dependent upon himself, meets his difficulties "like a man"; faces his own duty frankly, trusts himself, confident that consequences do not count when the right thing is done for its own sake. The good man feels that the steadfastness of the moral universe is back of him when he does his duty; as the lonely soldier on the nightwatches stands for his country, he has a right to his country's support.

Again the attitude is held that morality is itself sufficient authority for itself, that it seems to relieve us from the difficult and perhaps insoluble problems of religion. For instance, we need not ask, except as a matter of speculation in thinking, whether God exists or not; whether it is His love or His power that is defective; or whether the pain and disorder of this tragic world of ours are but appearances.

Lastly,, we are not committed to the task of finding some way of reconciling the reality of these evils with the reality of the love of God, which is clothed with unlimited power. This, of course, is the Christian's God. On this theory of things, it will not make any difference what our attitude to these problems will be;. our part as moral beings remains the same; we strive to do what is right whatever the solution offered or refused.

This is the attitude akin to that of the stoic; there belongs to it a nobility and strength that no one can deny.

On the other hand, the value of a religion which is real, of a genuine devotion to the Perfect, the spiritually Perfect, remains unimpaired and unquestionable. However stately the temple of this moral or stoic religion may appear, there is lacking something in the architecture which completes it, and makes it altogether beautiful and true. What is that? In this great sermon on Faith, Sir Henry Jones quotes Mr. T. H. Green thus:

> "If we are honest with ourselves, we shall admit that something best called faith, a prevailing conviction of our presence to God and His to us, of His gracious mind towards us, working in and through and with us, of our duty to our fellow-men as our brethren in Him, has been the source of

> "whatever has been best in us and in our deeds. If we have enough experience and sympathy to interpret fairly the life of the world around us, we shall admit that faith of this sort is the salt of the earth. Through it below the circumstance and custom, humanity is being renewed day by day, and unless our heart is sealed by selfishness and sophistry, though we may not consciously share in the process, there will be men and times that make us feel reverentially its reality. Who can hear an unargumentative and unrhetorical Christian minister appeal to his people to cleanse their hearts and to help each other as sons of God in Christ, without feeling that he touches the deepest and strongest springs of noble character in mankind?" (1)

Our author asks the question:

> "Is it quite certain that the splendid ethical recklessness which stands by its own deeds, accepting the condemnation of the eternal moral laws if the actions are wrong and, if they are right, finding ample reward in the mere doing of them - is it quite certain that this proud stoicism is not itself a true religion?" (2)

We have already said that the one great lack of morality as a religion is faith, which reminds us that there are traits and characteristics which faith always typifies; these are: humility, self-distrust, self-condemnation, and utter rejection of all claims to merit, a yielding up of the very soul to Him who can forgive and cleanse and heal.

We come at the close of this part of our inquiry to the same question we asked at the beginning: What is the relation between morality and religion? Do they at some point (their best) pass into each other, or, as we have been led to believe, are they different, or is there a difference between them, while leaving them both necessary to man, not reducible to

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 98
(2) do p. 98

sameness, nor reconcilable by any logic, that would bring them to a monotonous consummation?

The relation of morality and religion is more or less confused in the minds of people today. Many, I suppose, would maintain that morality is possible without religion. It must be said also that there is too much so-called religion that is not exactly moral, of which we sometimes speak as "religiosity", "churchianity" and such like.

This confusion is not confined to ordinary people, for it is amply echoed by our philosophers. We are constantly reminded of it, sometimes in one guise, sometimes in another. The idealism which is frank and fearless tries to give both religion and morality equal rights, but the result is a constant fluctuation between the primacy of one to that of the other. There is a constant changing of position; at one moment the Absolute is not the God of religion, and the God of religion is not Absolute. Whatever may be the ultimate solution of the problem involved in this relation between morality and religion, there is one thing certain, we cannot deny or do without the finite or the infinite, and above all, we cannot separate them. We may be a long way from the final solution of the finite and infinite, the dualism of nature and spirit, of secular and sacred, but has it not become at least suspect, and is there not in this very fluctuation a hint as to the probable solution?

There is today a widespread belief in the continuity of what is real. Reality is to continue; it does not become extinct. This belief in the continuity of the real is not

confined any longer to the material and physical. While we confess we cannot bridge the space between the material and spiritual, the physical and mental, yet we are thinking today not so much about the gap in the chain, as we are about discovering the "missing link". The feeling abroad now is that the means of connecting these two together remains only to be discovered. Nature is one.

In any case, it remains to be shown that all our halting dualisms, such as that of nature and spirit, or of matter and mind, rend assunder the seamless garment of the real. It is a significant, if somewhat neglected, truth that we can never know nature and spirit except as elements of a unity; whatever they are, they are parts of a whole; the soul functions and the soul is what it does. It is revealed not only in the world of nature, but also in the moral and religious life. Nature and spirit are in a sense partners and fellow-workers together. They imply each other; they are complementary one to the other; they are mutually necessary, and neither their difference nor their unity can be questioned. To follow the Hegelian dictum, the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world.

> "Nature is the experience, the living operation of the Absolute, and the Absolute is not only omnipresent in it, but real in virtue of it. It is as manifesting itself that the Absolute, on its part, lives and moves and has its being." (1)

Spirit exists as an active principle; nature is the expression of that principle.

> "The Absolute is not static, and the Universe is not dead." (2)

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 211
(2) do p. 102

This is the faith by which we live, and the conviction and consciousness of the religious man at his best.

SECTION B

An Examination of Sir Henry Jones' Philosophy

Sir Henry Jones teaches, among other things, that the sum total of things forms one system, and that man's reason can attain knowledge of the principal ideas of that system. This is what we understand by the Hegelian saying, "the rational is the real." It is the function of reason to discover and know this universe, to relate the different things to each other, and to the whole. He insists that reason operates along the same general lines in philosophy and religion as it does in the realm of physical science, and indeed in all the realms of human knowledge and life.

That is to say, reason assumes a hypothesis and then sets to work on this basis to relate things into one whole. Things are brought face to face with the hypothesis to test it. The problem of a science of religion is to set forth, in a definition which can be justified, that principle, which in the practice of the religious man, brings about the harmony of the divine and human, and lifts the secular to the level of the sacred. It may be of use to recall our conception of religion as, on the theoretical side, a point of view from which man sees what seems to him, at the time, to be ultimately real, self-sustained and real, in the light of which conception he re-interprets and revaluates all the facts of the secular life. The reflective religious spirit, never doubts that somehow, somewhere, sometime, the restoration of man is complete and the redemption of the world is final.

"God's in His Heaven; all's right with the world" is a vital conviction to religion, and true to him who thinks of the "world" in its context and not as a separate item. For it means that the world and the lives of men in it are, after all, parts or factors in a system, they must be judged, not as separate units, but as parts of a system into which they fit and which amply justifies them. On the other hand, the skeptic who considers that the conceptions on which religion is based are man's own inventions, that man's gods are just the reflection of his own mind, his faith a farce, must regard the whole realm of the real as also a farce, and a tragically sad farce. For the skeptic, the whole order of the Universe must collapse; he has no explanation of his own and can suggest nothing for the solution of the riddle. We have seen that this hypothesis stands as a bridge stands, because every stone has been placed in its proper place in the structure; that is, in its proper relations to the other stones. Each one supports the other, and the bridge as a whole supports each individual stone in the structure. But a bridge is built for the purpose of bearing weight, and though the bridge is built according to specifications and plans of architecture, yet it is the ability of the bridge to stand the strain of traffic that ultimately will test the bridge.

In like manner, to account for the world and our existence in it, men build their systems of philosophy; and the capacity of the system to carry the strain is the real test of any system. Will the system stand the burden of facts and human experience?

One of the great difficulties of Sir Henry Jones' system of philosophy is standing the strain placed upon it by one of the great facts of human life and experience - the evil which is in the world.

We can think of God, man, and the universe as members of one system, without thinking of them as making up one Being, but our author does not accept that; he says there is only one Being. God is the all-inclusive.

> "The Absolute leaves no room for its Absolute 'Other', which a contingency would be. The Absolute is not at all, if it be not all-comprehensive." (1)

It is not enough, according to Sir Henry Jones, to say that God is immanent; God is one with everything, one with men and all creatures, in all their joy and their sorrow. True, the Absolute is greater than they. God is always perfect and the future is already His, for His desires and will are accomplished in the world. But if we say with Sir Henry Jones that the Absolute is all-comprehensive, then the processes of the world are parts of God. The world process is good, the best good; this also is a part of the Absolute.

How can we reconcile the hypothesis of the all-comprehensiveness of the Absolute and the problem of pain and evil?

Sir Henry Jones does not find any great difficulty in understanding the sorrows andafflictions of life, such as sickness, pain, failure - evil undoubtedly to all men. But these are not without their uses; they are not of necessity without some good in them. To understand them, they must be considered in their relationship to the whole of man's

(1) "A Faith that Enquires" p. 241

existence. Their value will depend upon the uses made of them. They may be channels of good; oftentimes pain is a signal of danger to the physical and spiritual life; it may be a means of discipline, and if rightly used and heeded, may prove an inspiration to do good. It is a commonplace of our daily life to say that those things which are evil in our sight, if only rightly understood, may well prove of moral value to us. If this is true, then we must say that evil (that is, not moral evil) may have a place in a moral system of philosophy.

But when we come to consider moral evil, that is a different matter. Conscience must of necessity condemn all moral evil at all times. The question we have to ask ourselves is this: How can we justify its existence, and at the same time hold to our hypothesis that the universe is the best good?

Philosophers, as we know, have made many attempts to overcome this difficulty - the problem of evil, as it is called. Some maintain that evil is nothing but the failure of finite mind to comprehend; they tell us further that if we saw evil from the standpoint of God, we would understand it as a part of the best good; they make evil to be a form of the good. Again, others have said that evil is only a stage, a part of the progress of man in his journey upwards. Evil, we are told, may be a discord, but harmonize it with other notes, and together you have a full chord of harmony; so in reality the discord is something that after all enriches the whole, when it is placed in its right relationship. It is, at all events, a means to attain goodness.

"But the solution of the difficulty of natural evil, namely, that it is a means to a further good, and, in truth, has no intrinsic value or character of its own - that solution is wholly inapplicable to moral evil. Moral values are final. In this spiritual region, as I have already insisted, we are dealing with that which is in itself good or bad. What is morally right respects, and what ismorally wrong violates, a principle that is absolute. A morally wrong action cannot, like a natural misfortune, be made a stepping-stone or an instrument of well-being. In the spiritual sense the character of the act, as it stands, is final and irremediable. And the question we have to answer is: How,if God is verily perfect in power and goodness, the existence of moral evil can be accounted for. That moral evil of all kinds and degrees of enormity exists at all stages of human civilization cannot be denied. Must we not, therefore,limit the range and moderate the confidence of our religious faith? Must not the existence of God and his power and goodness be denied, or, what is virtually the same thing, must we not consider him incapable of coping with theevil of the world?" (1)

Sir Henry Jones refuses to accept this explanation of evil because he believes that it does away with the difference between good and evil. He cannot accept any solution of the problem of evil, that denies the reality of evil.

"What, then of evil? We can postpone the difficulty no longer, and I trust that we have now reached a point of view from which it can be dealt with.

"The problem is that of moral evil. That of natural evil is relatively easy. All that is natural is but means of the spiritual, and its value, whether positive or negative, is, as we have found, both derived or secondary and conditional. We do not as a matter of fact know whether a man's bad health, or other natural evil, may not be the most priceless element in his life. It may be conducive, as nothing else could be, to his spiritual good.

"But moral evil - to restate the point at which our argument had arrived - has a certain finality of character, just as moral good has. We cannot revalue it in the light of something else. Its value is intrinsic and negative. A bad act stands condemned at a court from which there is not appeal. It appears as a final flaw

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 182

> "in the scheme of things; as something that ought not to have taken place, but, having taken place, remains unredeemed, even if forgiven." (1)

Evil, therefore, is a reality and no explanation of moral evil which would deny its reality is valid. Again the writer conceives his belief in God as based upon his conviction that the process of learning how to live a good life is of absolute and final value. The worth or value there is in discipline and in learning how to live a good life is of absolute and final value. The worth or value there is in discipline and in learning to live the good life consists to a certain degree in the fact that it is an escape from the grip of evil. One of the things that a man is most conscious of is the knowledge of good and evil; if this knowledge is merely theoretical, and not something real, then man himself is not a reality. He is a mere form, shall we say, for a time, of the Absolute. Here we come upon a very important subject, that of Personality.

I. Personality

If we once admit that personality to a finite being is only appearance without any real independent existence of its own, then we also give up any reason for saying that the Absolute is a personality. We deny to the Absolute the attributes of personality. Strange to say, thinkers of the same school of thought as Sir Henry Jones - for example, Bradley and Bosenquet, accept this teaching. It must be said they are reasonable conclusions for anyone who believes that the Absolute is one Individual.

(1)"A Faith that enquires", p. 188

"As to the relation of God and the Absolute, Mr. Bradley says quite roundly (as is his admirable way)

"'For me the Absolute is not God. God for me has no meaning outside of the religious consciousness, and that essentially is practical. The Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will. When you begin to worship the Absolute or the Universe, and make it the object of religion, you in that moment have transformed it. It has become something forthwith which is less than the Universe.' (1)

"There are thus two supreme beings - the Absolute which Mr. Bradley identifies with the Universe and with the reality to which speculative research leads; and God, who is something less than the Universe and everything to religion. The Absolute is related to nothing, and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite will. Nothing stands over against the Absolute. All that exists is part of its content. God, on the other hand, must stand in relation to my will. Religion is practical. There is a perfect will, and there is my will; and the practical relation of these wills is what we mean by religion. And yet, if perfection is realized, what becomes of my will, which is over against the complete Good Will? While, on the other hand, if there is no such Will, what becomes of God?" (2)

If we assert that finite persons are realities, we must also assert that evil is reality, for it is such to a person's experience. But how can we consistently believe that the perfect Absolute alone exists? Sir Henry Jones does not agree with his fellow Hegelians because of another article in his belief, that is, the reality of personality; he believes that moral persons are always striving to reach the best possible and want to realize, if possible, the perfect.

II. The Good Overcomes the Bad
Man, not God, responsible for Evil

Personality indicates moral responsibility. Why, therefore,

(1) "Truth and Reality", p. 428
(2) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 242-243

does our author say that man himself is responsible for evil? Why go anywhere else to solve the problem of responsibility? Man is the creator of his sin, not God. By the act of creating man is it not reasonable to say that God limited Himself? He placed certain limitations upon His omnipotence; He created creators, as it were, and they created among other things, we must say, sin. If we understand the teaching of Sir Henry Jones at this point, he cannot or does not accept this way out of the difficulty. It is true he places thqutmost emphasis upon man's responsibility, but he does not admit te possibility of creation to man.

> "We can attribute nothing whatsoever original or creative to the individual. He brings with him into his social, as into his physical world, nothing but a power of appropriating, that is, of converting the social forces which play around him, or at least some of them, into personal forces, into opinions, convictions, volitions. The language he speaks is his country's; the thoughts which he expresses are its traditions; the habits he forms are its customs; he is its product almost as the fruit is of a tree." (1)

From the foregoing we see that the whole content of man's personality - his ideas, his language, his desires, his physical strength, his moral capacity come from the Universe, his world. It is his world that even gives him the power to challenge itself, to change it perhaps to suit his own convenience. Now we have already seen, according to Sir Henry Jones' teaching, that the Universe is a part of the all-inclusive - the Absolute. It is not possible to limit the responsibility for evil to the individual; that depends upon a man's will. But again the working out

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 218

of a man's will is a part of the world-process and that is part of the divine plan. How does our author meet this again? He tells us that the possibility of sin is a moral condition -

> "But moral evil has a certain finality of character, just as moral good has. We cannot revalue it in the light of some thing else. Its value is intrinsic and negative. A bad act stands condemned at a court from which there is no appeal.
> "The conclusion usually drawn from this final character of spiritual evil, a conclusion which looks inevitable, is that God is imperfect. He is either responsible for the scheme of things that includes evil or he is not. The latter alternative obviously implies that he is a finite being; the former, that he either cannot or will not exclude evil from the scheme and express himself in a flawless universe. Both alternatives alike deprive God of his perfection, and, in fact, stultify the conception upon the truth of which religion depends.
> "But another conclusion is possible. Let it be granted that moral evil is final and unalterable, if the world is to serve the spiritual process whereby man attains moral goodness the possibility of doing what is morally wrong must remain." (1)

The possibility of sin is, therefore, a condition of moral goodness. Now, choosing the good means refusing the bad, and refusing the evil admits of the possibility of choosing the evil also. This refusal to choose the evil is part of the great struggle of life. The value of the moral life lies in the free choosing of the good; that is, the slow but sure process of the moral character. This gradual overcoming of evil is the promise of certain and final victory in the end. Man has been placed in theworld to attain goodness, to learn to live right, "the great art". Now the universe must obviously be such as to admit of the

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 188

possibility of right living; at least, it must be so constructed, or so ordered, that he can at least learn to attain the good. He must be able to learn. It follows that there must belong to this Universe in which he is placed, the possibility of doing good and of doing evil. This universe, therefore, is a better one than the one in which the possibility of choosing the evil is left out, as the latter makes learning to do and live good impossible.

> "The world, we have said, is the manifestation of a never-resting process which is spiritual. Every act is a step or stage in this process, and it acquires its value therefrom. That which is ultimate operates in it; but it operates in man in such a way as to permit the possibility or moral choice and therefore of moral evil. A world that excluded this possibility would not be the best, indeed it would not be spiritual at all. But granted that such a world is best, then it justifies what is incidental to it." (1)

It is reasonable for us to expect the Perfect to constitute beings to reach the best possible - moral beings, beings that are learning to live good lives, rather than inert, static, unchanging; adventurous, free to use their will and therefore free to exercise their choice, even though they run the risk of falling into the snares of the evil, and giving way to temptation. We can believe that the world, therefore, is reasonably the best possible.

> "God has called into being the best possible world: the best possible world is a world in which the conditions or moral choice and therefore of moral evil exist: moral evil is thus justified in the sense that its possibility is necessary as a condition of that is best." (2)

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 189
(2) do p. 189

This cannot be. We are not free to suppose that evil is necessary to goodness, for the very good reason that it does not possess the same ultimate reality. The tendency of evil is to pass away, to become a loss, a "dead loss". The nature of evil is to make itself impossible.

> "Not only is moral evil capable of being overcome, and of being supplanted by the opposite good, it is converted into it." (1)

Evil tends to destroy itself. Evil is transitory, temporal, but good abides. It is in the nature of goodness to remain andto increase. Evil can exist only in the shadow of darkness; "it is of the night"; it cannot stand the light of knowledge and enlightenment. With the growth of knowledge as to the nature of the good and the best, the moral life gains in strength, and "whatsoever it doeth, it shall prosper." Perhaps it does not gain prosperity and ease, but those things after all are not the things promised nor primarily expected. The reward given a good man, after all, is usually more responsibility, more and heavier burdens, greater tasks, more difficult problems, persecution and even the cross! Because a man is good is no guarantee that he shall escape evils, but at the same time he is able through it all to grow in goodness. A good deed always leaves the doer a better man. If anyone says Sir Henry Jones could prove that goodness at any time fails, then his system collapses.

> "My conclusions are based, from beginning to end, upon an assumption which I have made no attempt

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 193

to justify, and which, if false, deprives our attempt of all value. The assumption is that the moral life has a value which is final, unlimited and absolute. By the moral life I mean the process of forming a good character; by good character I mean a way of living which, in all its details, is dedicated to the service of the best, and is therefore the fulfilment, at one and the same time, of the moral law and of the will of God. From the absolutness and finality of the value of the process of learning goodness it follows, that everything which furthers that process is good in the most unqualified sense, and that everything which hinders it is evil. Moral progress is our principle of evaluation and our only authoritative measuring rod. We approve and we condemn by reference to it, and to it only." (1)

III. The Good has the Power of overcoming Evil

This is an experience of our daily life. It is possible that sometime it may overcome it completely. That may not be in the life that we now live, for our author believes in a life after the present one, in a world to come.

"At first sight the good may seem to be capable of being defeated in the same way. But this is not the case. No doubt the good purpose is often frustrated and the good act often seems to leave things as they were. But the moral effect of the volition and the deed are not lost upon the doer. He has gained by his resolve, and is the better man for his effort. Never does the moral good fail. Far less does it negate itself, disappointing the agent who does the good act by proving empty or delusory. And this is one of the main grounds by the emphasis thrown upon the hazard and hardship of the moral life is misleading. There is present in every good a necessity that cannot be turned aside or overcome. It is that good results shall follow efforts after the good; that character is built up; that there is positive moral advance on the part of the agent. In a sense, there is neither hazard or hardship. The moral gain is certain. It is inevitable. All the powers of darkness resist it in vain. And, unless the standard of value is wrong, no hardship can be affirmed in learning goodness any more than in any other progressive effort. The difficulty in doing what is right may be real and very great, but the attempt is a joy. I cannot pity anyone for trying to be good, however 'arduous' and unrelenting 'reality' may be." (2)

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 270
(2) do. p. 194

Now the demand for a world in which wrong doing is not possible has all these characteristics. It is not only a demand for that whose conditions do not exist, but for that whose conditions would be inconsistent with what is deemed best, namely, the process of the moral life, the spiritual enterprise. It is no proof of either power or wisdom not to bring about the self-contradictory. God is not imperfect nor is his power limited because he cannot bring about that which contradicts itself. That were to do and to undo at once.

The whole argument depends upon what is meant by perfection. Is a perfect world a world in which nothing ought to be that is not, or in which no change is either desirable or possible? Then our world is manifestly, once for all, most imperfect. Such a static world, however, we have said, cannot be spiritual in character, nor give man the opportunity of learning and practising goodness. But the learning and practising of goodness, the active willing and doing of that is right, is, we maintain, the best life possible for man, and the world which most favors this end, or which invites these activities, calling upon man with the voice of Duty, is the best world. In a word, the best world is dynamic, the scene of the working of the good; hence evil, the only final evil, would be that which arrested this process, or is itself overcome, and, in the last resort, constrained to enter into the service of the good.

> "This question is a question of fact. Is it a fact that moral evil is a fixed finality, or does it, when it comes full around, destroy itself, leaving behind it distrust of itself and incentives to another way of life?
> "This question is often put in a way that permits only one answer. Evil is assumed to be something objective and real, standing over against another objective and real fact that we call the good. But neither the evil nor good exists in this sense.

> They are characteristics of what is real but not themselves separate realities. In short, moral good and moral evil are ways in which the will operates, characteristics of man's aims and efforts. They are evaluations, or estimates of facts, true or false; and they exist only when, and as long as, the process of willing goes on." (1)

Perhaps we might say there is one serious defect in this theory of Sir Henry Jones. It is not, it seems to me, a solution of the fact of sin, but an exposition of the possibility of evil, a solution or attempt to solve the possibility of evil, and not the reality of evil. "They are characteristics of what is real". (2) We are told that evil tends to cease to exist, and that in the end it will be destroyed.

> "Moral evil left to work itself out and ripen, will prove to be self-contradictory and ultimately self-deleting." (3)

But is not this merely the same as saying that evil is not as "real" as goodness? It is again a comment upon its unreality. If our author does not admit that evil may be the shadow of good things, or a means to attain the good, then evil itself must possess reality. To return to his basic hypothesis, the all-inclusive system must include and account for the presence of evil. If this is the case, a God that is good is the only solution. But there is another life. If a "man dies in his sins", can anyone be certain that matters end so?

> "Can it be that his demonstration of the ugliness and barrenness of evil-doing has been on the whole a gain to the world; and is the real result of his life - now, let us say, finally extinguished - a warning against evil and a strengthening of the resolve toward goodness? In that case, although the individual has been deleted, his life so far from arresting the spiritual process has strengthened it." (4)

It may have strengthened the process in others, I imagine the critic replies, but his own life taken as it stands, remains a blot and a blur, and a final failure of God's goodness.

(1) (2) (3) (4) "A Faith that Enquires", ps. 191,191,192,193

The failure is assumed to be final because it is assumed that death ends all. But does it? If so, if a man's whole career ends with death, then I cannot justify the existence and destiny of man nor retain my religious faith. For I consider that it is not enough that his blundering life should be a gain to others; the individual himself must come out victor. But who is entitled to affirm that death ends all? Browning conjectured that death might flash the truth on Guido, as the lightning at blackest night revealed Naples - for an instant -

> "so may the truth be flashed out by one blow,
> And Guido see, one instant, and be saved.
> Else I avert my face, not follow him
> Into that sad obscure sequestered state
> Where God unmakes but to remake the soul
> He else made first in vain; which must not be." (1)

Sir Henry Jones believes, like Browning, his favorite poet, that it would be the ultimate failure of Divine Power and Goodness to say that there is no life beyond death. He believes that this

> "natural arena of this short, fragile, changing, restless life seems to me to be too small to decide issues that are moral, and the destiny of beings whose nature is spiritual. Death may be a mere incident in their history, a natural event and nothing more; and a quite different kind of environment may be necessary to elicit and give play to the possibilities of spirit." (2)

In that new environment which is to be spiritual, goodness will have full scope for its power to overcome evil.

(1) "The Ring and the Book," "The Pope", 2127-2132
(2) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 193

SECTION C

God as His Relation to - (a) Man; (b) The World

In this third and closing section of this study, we shall be engaged with the most difficult of all the problems that face the mind of man, namely, God and His relation to the finite world and especially to man.

Sir Henry Jones tells us the Absolute of Philosophy is the God of Religion; God, or the Absolute, is also a Person. To attempt a definition of the word person is extremely difficult, assuming that God is a Person.

It is important and also interesting to note that our author in this brilliant series of lectures does not take into account the doctrine of the Trinity; he in fact ignores it completely. (He was trained for the Presbyterian ministry in Wales). It is not for us to raise questions which the author himself omits, again differing from the usual custom of the Hegelian school which perhaps regards the doctrine of the Trinity as one of the most important doctrines of Chrstianity. Those of the modern Hegelian way of thinking generally do the same as Sir Henry Jones- they ignore the doctrine completely. At the same time, we should suppose there would have been room for two persons at least in a system that emphasizes love as the ruling factor. It seems to me that had our author found room, in his philosophy, he would have made it far more attractive, if at the same time more complex. It must be admitted on the hther hand, that his system, if such it can be called, would be very difficult of interpretation and elucidation. Undoubtedly questions would arise which would be very difficult to answer.

What are we to understand by Person? We at once turn to man, as the obvious example of what Person is. Therefore the study of man should yield us some knowledge of what a person is.

Following our author in his discussion of Man, we can formulate his teaching under two points -

I. Man is Exclusive

We begin by saying that man as personality has distinctive traits and characteristics. A person may be said to exist unto himself, or to put it in another way, a person is conscious of himself. He differentiates himself from everybody and everything. No one shares with him the thing that is truly his; he has a way all his own of doing things; he sees with his own eyes; he has his own particular view point; he forms his own judgements and arrives at his own conclusions. His every desire, longing and action are his own. We say they have the stamp of a man's own personality. This is what makes what we call in letters "style". A writer's style is himself revealed in his writings. This individuality is something very real and abiding. It also carries its peculiar responsibilities. No one can perform a man's duty but the man himself; no one,on the other hand, can neglect his duty but the man to whom it belongs. We see clearly that man is always and will always be responsibile for what he does and is.

> "No one can recognize a man's duty instead of him; nor neglect it except himself. This means that the immanence of the activity of the universe becomes in man an activity that is free. And it carries with it the conditions necessary for actions which have a moral character and can be called in the fulness of the meaning of the word, right or wrong. The

> "power that is operative reveals itself as a 'power working for righteousness' in the form of individual wills. And moral right or wrong is right or wrong in a final and ultimate sense. Morality undoubtedly demands this final undivided or individual responsibility. However true it may be that we ought and can bear one another's burdens, we cannot commit one another's right or wrong actions. Mine are mine and my neighbour's are my neighbour's to the end of time, and whatever takes place. We may be more than willing to bear the burden of the consequences of the ill-doing of others, and we do not hesitate to share the good things our helpful social environment provides, but the privacy of the actual volitions and deeds stands wholly unimpaired. The responsibility and the guilt of the bad act cling to the doer only, and the sense of them often seems more imperishable than any of its other consequences. The 'stain' will not wash." (1)

In virtue of his personality, according to the foregoing, we must conclude that man's life is entirely an inner life and seems to enclose itself within itself. It is "exclusive" of all else.

II. Man is Inclusive

"Man is man in virtue of his kinship with the world". (2) In contrast to our first statement that man, in virtue of his personality is exclusive of all else around him, it is also true as a characteristic of personality that he is "inclusive". That is to say, man has a wide outlook; he can take in the world in its vastness. The circle of his sympathy is a wide one. "Man is man in virtue of his kinship with the world; not because his self is private, but for the very opposite reason." (3)

This must be so if man is to develop and progress;. his world must be an ever enlarging world. His life must reach out in its interests and activity of body and soul. In short, if a man is to grow, he must cast his roots deep in

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 119
(2) and (3) "A Faith that enquires", p. 152

the soil of his world.

> "Man grows as his knowledge widens, and as his interests extend; that is, he grows in the degree in which he goes out into and takes possession of his world. The universe of the little man is small, and it is very powerless and niggardly. It helps him very little, and it leaves him very poor and impotent. The universe of the great man is itself great; it is the instrument of his purposes as well as the content of his intelligence; and its bountifulness knows no limit. He is a greater self through the comprehensiveness of his knowledge and practical purposes. It is the morally great man who takes upon himself the burdens of the world. The perfect man, we are told, lived and died not only for his neighbours or his nation or his age, but for the lasting good of all mankind. On the other hand, a man is imperfect, undeveloped, small, in the degree in which he shuts himself inside himself and treats his personality as exclusive." (1)

We have now seen that man in his relation to the world may be both exclusive and inclusive. These two theories are broadly accepted by Sir Henry Jones. According to his teaching, they are both necessary aspects of personality. The Hegelian school of philosophers as a rule emphasizes the "Inclusive"; the Pluralists, on the other hand, the "Exclusive". But we need not accept one theory and refuse the other, for in our author's system he finds a place for both. We cannot hold personal responsibility as valid unless we accept the "exclusive" theory. When we come into the sphere of religion, we must have the "inclusive" theory to account for it also, for religion insists that God in man inspires and creates his ideals, and helps him realize them. The religious man, on the other hand, feels that God is within him, and a part of his very being.

(1)"A Faith that Enquires", p. 129

III. God and Personality

We now come to a most important part of our study. Let us apply the two theories as far as we are able to follow our author to the being of God.

a. The Absolute of Philosophy

Philosophy, in speaking of God as the Absolute, places the emphasis, as we have already seen, upon the "inclusive". If God is one with the Absolute, then his personality is "inclusive". For the Absolute contains everything and everybody. It is impossible to conceive of the Absolute as one Being without saying he is a person. There can be nothing that is foreign or outside of a perfect Person. Through coming to know a person or an object, it is brought into unity with Himself. To the extent that we know a person or an object, to the same extent does it become part of us. It is a commonplace that any two persons who really love each other, with a great and abiding love, in time become one. If a man loves God, he experiences a certain oneness with God. This was Paul's experience when he said:

> "I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." (1)

Indeed, it might be said that the unity of personality depends upon the relation of self and things outside itself.

> "One may become a self without becoming a person". (Professor Buckham)

One becomes a person or personality by the self reaching out into its surrounding environment and becoming one with it at its best.

Man comes to himself as he comes into right relationships with his world, his fellow-men and his God.

(1) I Gal. 2:20

> "Self-consciousness is essentially that which overpowers external relations. Man as a rational being goes out of himself, so to speak, so as to know and use objects (and there can exist nothing which is not potentially his object), but he always returns to himself enriched, for he brings back as a part of his own experience something of the meaning and use of the facts he has been dealing with. Not only so; there is nothing save self-consciousness which does overcome external relations. It alone achieves unity in difference. Self-consciousness is one with itself only through its relation to objects; for a subject that has no object, that does not say 'I' as over against something else, is not possible. In denying personality, or self-consciousness to the Absolute, Mr. Bradley is thus permitting external relations to be final; and his Universe is in no sense a unity. Its differences cannot be made to come together. Everything within it holds everything else at arm's length. The ultimate relation between its elements is negative; and the Universe is, at best, a mere collection of particulars." (1)

Let us now turn to the other aspect:

b. The God of Religion

We have seen that the philosophy of the Absolute places the emphasis upon that aspect of Personality which is "indusive". Morality and religion place the emphasis upon the "exclusive" aspect of the personality of God.

To the religious mind, God is the great reality that corresponds to his idealism. He is the Best, the Good, the Perfect. His function is to inspire and create our ideals. To do His will is to seek the best good, and to refuse anything but the good. God realizes Himself in us when we seek to do His will, and that which is pleasing in his sight. The Infinite realizing Himself in the finite -

> "Surely the infinite that stands merely opposed to the finite must be another finite. The true infinite must be that which reveals and realizes itself in the finite." (2)

Therefore, according to the "inclusive" hypothesis, we must unite God with everything. God's personality is one with

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 248
(2) do p. 139

the Best only on the "exclusive" hypothesis.

IV. Morality and Religion

How does our author reconcile these two aspects of personality as they are present and reflected in the life of man? The relation between them is made clear, as we examine further the relation between morality and religion.

From the standpoint of morality, the central truth is man's own responsibility, as we saw in lecture ten.

> "Morality demands this final, undivided, or individual responsibility". (1)

Man, himself, so to speak, is the sole owner of his actions be they evil or good, and his moral character and his deserts depend upon what he does. What is a man's life when he faces the standards and demands of morality? Is it not failure? The law demands perfection, but man is unable to fulfill the demands of the moral law. All the work of man is imperfect. It is true the activity of his life may be an attempt to reach the demand of the moral law, but it is a fact of our experience that we continually fail in the attempt.

> "For we are all become as one that is unclean and all our righteousness are as a polluted garment." (2)

If our righteousnesses is so described, what must be our unrighteousness? Yet this is not man's only experience. He may know and does know, in spite of his degradation, he may experience forgiveness; he may be reconciled to God. He comes to believe that the Perfect does not count his wrong-doing against him; his faith can unite him to God, and the

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 119
(2) Isa. LXIV:6

consciousness that God is his portion fills him with hope and gladness, and brings again a renewal of strength. This is what Sir Henry Jones calls justification by faith.

> "Justification by faith means that, having thus identified myself with the object, I feel myself in that identification to be one with it, andto enjoy the bliss of being, all falsehood overcome, what I truly am. By my claim to be one with the ideal, which comprehends me too, and by assertion of the non-reality of all that is opposed to it, the evil in the world and the evil incarnate in me through past bad acts, all this falls into the unreal. I being one with the ideal, this is not mine, and so imputation of the offences goes with the change of self, and applies not now to my true self, but to the unreal, which I repudiate and hand over to destruction." (1)

In this experience of justification, we are told that the "exclusive" self has been denied and repudiated. The bounds of his personality, so to speak, have been enlarged until they henceforth contain within their larger scope the strength and value of the Good Himself. Does this mean that man has ceased to be imperfect, and in thus handing himself his "old self to destruction", has he also shifted the responsibility which was his? Man's conscience at once says, no. Is religion, after all, only a semblance, a sham? No, he is sure of the reality of religion. Now the question arises, How can be reconcile his moral judgment and his religious experience? We might answer that they cannot be reconciled, because they belong to two different worlds - the one material, the other spiritual.

But Sir Henry Jones does not accept this answer. It would be untrue to his conception that all things consist in each other in one system; and the study of history shows

(1) "Ethical Studies", F. H. Bradley, p. 292-3

that we cannot separate religion and morality without loss to both.

Apart from morality, religion loses its reality. Religion without morality becomes a farce. Jesus clearly saw this in his day; His scathing words of denunciation against the so-called religious leaders show this. On the other hand, without religion the heart loses its sense of courage and strength; there is a sense of failure where religion is wanting. The very fellowship of kindred souls in worship and devotion is in itself a tower of strength and a rallying point, without which the heart would be discouraged. But given morality and religion together, nothing can withstand them - one reinforces the other.

In the light of religion, the failures of the good man are not really failures after all; there may be only "two or three", but if they are "in His name", that is enough for the religious man; on the other hand, in the light of morality, to the religious mind, religion is the consciousness of the best and consecration to the best. If we could only see these two, religion and morality, in their proper setting, we should see that a moral life is the work of God and man. They are after all "fellow-workers" together. As a man reaches out to possess the good and make it his own, it can be said that there is to human personality an aspect that is infinite; there is a phase of it that is infinite. It can also be said that there is a finite phase to the personality of God, because God seeks to realize Himself in the finite,

> "the finite in the infinite in endless process of self-realization". (1)

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 139

Therefore, in the process of realizing or learning or experiencing new goodness, a new perfection is gained by God. This implies that God is not "static perfection" (1), but "infinite process", "the infinite in endless process."

Thus, according to this teaching, the Infinite Life moves from stage to stage, each stage being different to the other, but each one perfect.

Sir Henry Jones, therefore, does not follow the general argument of the Hegelians when they admit that there may be change possible within the Absolute, yet the Absolute himself does not change. From the standpoint of the all-inclusive hypothesis, all progress toward and in perfection within that system is only apparent.

Sir Henry Jones, on the other hand, emphasizes the reality of the process and holds that the Absolute changes. The Absolute in the last resort is the Process. The process of the Universe is part of the Absolute. Again, every stage in the movement of the Universe is the best possible.

> "The infinite that we do know and have a right to call just or unjust, is the power which manifests itself in the events of the world, natural and spiritual, in which we live. That infinite is a process which never rests". (2)

Again and again the important factor is the "process", and every change in the onward movement of the process is the best possible, because Infinite Reason and Love cannot fail. The Universe as it shall come into being the next moment, as it were, will be also the best possible. Will it be then perfect? That were a senseless question. It is a question, like many others, that has for its basis a wrong conception of the state

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 139
(2) do p. 145

we call perfect. Perfection, whatever it may be, is not necessarily a static thing. It is not something that never changes, that always remains the same; it is not something that has "arrived", but something that is always achieving the best. This conception of the Perfect is contrary to all we know of life and development.

To say, therefore, that the Perfect stage is one that cannot be surpassed is in reality a contradiction in terms. All life, including the moral and the spiritual, is a "process". Now, if the best possible is reached, as we have seen every moment, we cannot reasonably request or demand more. To ask more is unreasanable. It is also reasonable to infer that the "process" is not a failure if by that is meant learning goodness, for it accomplishes something worth-while all the time.

> "From this point of view the process must be regarded as at the goal all the time. That is to say, if the process is going on, nothing more can be reasonably required; for the process is the operation of the ideal. And the ideal, so far from being something more or less distant, unreal, awaiting to be reached and actualized, is present already as the ultimate reality which manifests itself in the facts and events. It follows that no moral effort fails. Fulfilment of the whole law is, indeed, not attained - an end which is not moral - on the other hand the whole process is a process of attaining. But the final end is never aimed at except as, and in so far as, it is embodied in some particular. Morality is not the pursuit of an abstract universal good, but of the good as particularized in this or that duty. Every good deed, that is to say, every rational exercise of the will, is commendable so long as it goes on. When effort ceases, nothing remains to be praised or approved. The attainment, as I have already said, must be a stepping stone and not a stopping place." (1)

We see now that morality looked upon as a process is something

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 126-127

that invariably succeeds - indeed must succeed. If that is true, we must needs re-evaluate our former conception of morality, and the place of morality as to its importance in the scheme of things. To condemn morality because it does not attain the ideal now, or ever, is to be unjust to it. The law itself does not ask this; it is enough, we are told, to follow the gleam, if we are constant in our following.

> "But not even for the sake of the religious consciousness can we repudiate the world of endeavor, or deny the reality and the value of the moral act. And, for my part, I cannot admit that all man's moral actions are failures. Some of them, I believe, are perfect; and not even the poorest of them is a mere failure, attaining and amounting to nothing. The religious devotees who call moral actions 'trash' and affirm that we are all as an unclean thing, and all our religiousness as 'filthy rags', are, I believe, proceeding on a wrong supposition in passing their judgment." (1)

CONCLUSION

To bring this discussion to a close, our author seeks to harmonize morality and religion by viewing them, the one from the standpoint of the other. In this way the seeming difficulties which threatened their reconcilation at their first examination, are somewhat modified. From this way of regarding morality and religion, we see that the real and final value of morality does not consist in attaining to some objective which lies beyond and ahead of us, but rather the value of morality lies in the "process" of learning to live a good life.

Again this "process" implies the activity of man, and that of God.

In this way man's freedom and independence are conserved

(1)"A Faith that EnquiresE, p. 123-4

and made secure.

"Independence becomes freedom." (1)

Man may now see the possibility of being saved from guilt, fear and failure. For if the "process" cannot fail, and if the present good is the best good possible now, then he knows, or at least he may win for himself that inward knowledge and belief that all things work together for good to those who love God, which is to say, who love the Best. If we understand Sir Henry Jones correctly, this is the form or construction he places upon sanctification by faith; faith in the process which is itself good, and that faith a part of the man's own vital experience of God, The Best.

"A Thing is What it Does"

According to Sir Henry Jones' interpretation, so far as we have been able to follow him, he emphasizes the idea that "process" is fundamental to everything in the Universe.

"A thing is what it does". (2)

Nothing exists except that which is process, and everything that exists is what it does. This also must apply to the Absolute. It may be suggested here that the scientific theory of "Conservation of Energy" has influenced his thinking at this point.

However, it is the use Sir Henry Jones makes of this idea of conservation of energy to explain development in the Infinite that makes it interesting. According to the "exclusive" hypothesis of the personality of the Infinite, he is perfect in every sense of the term. But on the other

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 118
(2) do. p. 120

hand, according to the "inclusive" hypothesis, in the process of development, a new experience comes to him, that is to say, the "process" of acquiring goodness on the part of the finite beings contained in the Infinite..

We see, therefore, according to this method of argument there is a continuous development and progress. For the "process" is not something that repeats the old experience, but a new experience at every stage in its development. It is also cumulative, because no good thing is lost that has once been achieved. Each good act that a man does makes him a better man.

> "I douht if any act is morally good except in so far as it affects thecharacter of the doer, makes the man a better man." (1)

It also, because it is cumulative, fosters and helps other men to be good. The civilization of the present is the outcome of the past civilization.

> "The civilization of the past is the starting point of the present, even although life always begins at the beginning. There is not one lost good. Morality is a continuous development of mankind's will to good. It is a growing process: the highest ideal breaking out into a succession of different manifestations as mankind moves from stage to stage." (2)

The Process in Its Relation to the Good, the Perfect

How can we describe this "process" from the standpoint of the good? Is it perfect?

In answer to such questions Sir Henry Jones would say, and does say: It is (the "process") the best possible. Then

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 127
(2) do p. 127

comes another inevitable question: Is this "best possible", that is, the process, the best possible in the same sense that we say God is the best possible - The Good, The Perfect? He does not indicate this.

We must therefore say that we have two processes, the movement from perfection to perfection and from the best possible to the best possible. Again, what is the relation between these two movements? We have seen that the first is necessary to the second, for the operation of the Best in the Universe is the guarantee that the process of the world is the best possible.

But is the second of these movements necessary to the first? In other words, does the perfection of the Good depend upon it? It does so depend, according to our author. Men were created, he says, because Love must needs have objects to love, and the thing that continually allures this love of God to man is the increasing and growing consecration to the good. It follows, therefore, that God's delight in the finite is an element in His own existence. Therefore, to put it in plainer form, the finite in its activity makes a contribution to the life of the Infinite. Again, if the developing process of the universe affords some new experience to God, He is therefore realizing continuously something new. It is doubtless true that the Infinite has knowledge of that which shall take place, but there is a difference between pre-knowledge of events and the gaining of new experience of them. When they arrive or take place -

> "The Absolute knows the end - were there an end! - from the beginning; and fuller knowledge thereof cannot be acquired. Nevertheless, one may ask, what is involved in the transition from the cognitive or intellectual foresight and anticipation

to
"of events, on the one side,/the experience of them, on the other, as actually taking place? The distinction is quite real; and there may be in the actual participation of the Absolute in finite processes, or of the God of Love in the doings and destiny of his children, more than there can be in the mere foresight of them. That participation cannot lack meaning and value, as we readily see if we conceive the opposite, namely, a God who sits aloof from the world-course and looks on." (1)

CRITICISM

"To me the idea of God," says Sir Henry Jones, "as the perfect in process, as a movement from splendour to splendour in the spiritual world, as an eternal achievement and never-resting realization of the ideals of goodness in human history, is endlessly more attractive and, I believe, more consistent with our experience in the present world than the idea of a Divine Being who sits aloof fromthe world-process, eternally contemplating his own perfections. Love, at any rate, is directly and finally inconsistent with such an aloofness. And the religion of Love, which Christianity is, undoubtedly identifies the destiny of God and man: God suffers in our sufferings, and rejoices in our joys. He is our Father; and He moves with us, because he moves in us." (2)

The last quotation is perhaps the finest passage in these noble lectures; not only is it eloquent and full of music, but it pulsates with a living and vital faith in the onward march of things. We hear, as we said at the beginning, the voice of the preacher, and we catch thevision of the prophet, and all stand out clear in the light of profound scholarship.

Who is there that does not agree with this fine idealism? At the same time, we are bound to ask, Has our author made out

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 231
(2) do p. 277

his case in favour of the belief inthe Absolute as one Being, that is, one Individual and that Being one Person.

Does the above quoted statement as to the idea of God rest upon this hypothesis? Must we not believe that the "all" that exists makes up one great system? But we have seen that in the system there are two "processes", having different moral characteristics. They can make up one system, and depend one upon the other, without forming one Being. It is difficult upon this assumption to see how they can be One.

The "exclusive" view of personality does away or denies all relationship between God and evil; that is solely man's responsibility.

The "inclusive" view, on the other hand, does not necessarily mean any more than that God is aware of evil and allows it to be. Again, if we admit also that God sympathizes with men, and seeks to redeem men from the "process", this would hardly lead us to conclude that they and He are One Being.

Sir Henry Jones' argument in this connection does not prove more than that there is only one all-inclusive system.

Let us consider for a moment what the characteristics of personal life are; they are experience of things, and love of certain objects - that is to say, knowledge and love. This means there are different objects to be known and loved. But following our author's thought at this point, he says a person who comes into certain relations with the objects about him, unites them with himself. This we are bound to admit. Yet is there not a difference

between saying they are united with that person, and saying that he himself is those objects? True, their relations with each other make them part of the same system, but again we cannot see how this makes them one person.

The material or physical, and the social world, for example, come into a certain unity with all of us. But I am not the world; yet, I and the rest of mankind may belong to the same system. Here Sir Henry Jones is undoubtedly upon sure ground when he says that only an Infinite Person could unify, or shall we say complete, the world, or as Mr. Bradley would put it, a "super-personal" being.

It is clear that our author could not conceive of one system which is all-inclusive, without not only conceiving of the system being unified or made one by a person, but also making up one person. This, it seems to me, is his chief conclusion regarding the all-inclusive system or the "process".

Before leaving this difficult but absorbing study, let us ask what we gain, if we gain anything, in saying with Sir Henry Jones, that the sum of all being is one Person. He tells us that this statement gives us a surety that Reason and Love will not fail in their attempt to gain the best.

> "Reason comes to the support of the religion which is enlightened." (1)

This is because of the undying belief that sooner or later, somewhere, sometime, Reason and Love will surely make their appeal to moral beings. This is the great ideal of Sir

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 269

Henry Jones' mind; he stakes his all upon this. He believes in the ethical character and the universal ideal of the cosmos. Here he finds his proof for believing in the immortality of the soul.

> "No stronger proof of immortality is either possible or necessary than that which shows that it is a necessary condition of an orderly universe. The two hypotheses support each other. The truth of each of them, taken by itself, is probable; its truth by relation to its complement is irrefragable.
> "God is. God is perfect. His lovingkindness and power are unlimited; and His greatest gift to man is the gift of the power, tendency and opportunity to learn goodness. God's goodness being unlimited, the opportunity not made use of by man in the present life is renewed for him in another life, and in still another; till, at last, his spirit finds rest in the service of the God of Love. For my part, I wish no stronger proof of the permanence of the spiritual process, and I ought not to care for aught beside: that supreme good involves every good." (1)

(1) "A Faith that Enquires", p. 268

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